
Using AbortSignal.any to Compose Timeout and Cancellation Signals in fetch
Learn how to use AbortSignal.any to combine timeout and user cancellation signals in fetch requests for more robust async operations.

Learn how to use AbortSignal.any to combine timeout and user cancellation signals in fetch requests for more robust async operations.

A deep technical walkthrough of testing Microsoft Edge's Prompt API for JavaScript text rewrites, covering capability detection, latency measurement, output quality evaluation, and fallback strategies.

A hands-on deep technical walkthrough stress-tests Gemini 4 Neon’s 1M-token context window past 200K tokens, measuring retrieval accuracy, reasoning drift, latency, and agentic coding reliability against Google’s benchmark claims.

This deep technical walkthrough maps how new US export controls and TSMC's 16nm-and-below restrictions propagate from GPU SKUs and cloud instances into base images, CI runners, and AI build pipelines.

CVE-2026-123890 is reported as an authentication-bypass flaw in VMware vCenter, exploited for roughly two months before Broadcom shipped fixes around 19–20 November 2026. Reported post-exploitation activity includes hijacking administrator accounts and pulling VM data out. This short walks the defensive order from the write-up: don't start with patch timing, start with whether an admin session was minted on your control plane. What's covered: - Why a vCenter admin session is a bearer credential over the whole virtualization inventory, not an app login - Enumerating and terminating sessions with SessionManager so a patch doesn't leave a live intruder behind - Response order: isolate, patch, rotate credentials and sessions, then hunt assuming admin access - Log evidence to look for in vpxd and SSO logs — new identity sources, plugin extensions, fresh administrators - Persistence created through legitimate features (identity sources, Global Permissions, custom roles, extension plugins, solution user certificates) that survives patching - Why recovery here means rebuilding trust in the estate rather than restoring an app Scope and honesty: the post separates what public reporting confirms from what is inferred from the authentication-bypass bug class. Affected build ranges, the CVSS vector and the exact vulnerable component were not confirmed at the time of writing — read the vendor advisory for those. Everything here is defensive and lab-scoped; placeholders are used for hosts, accounts and log lines. Full write-up with the audit checklist, scoring model and log queries: https://hackyjs.com/posts/auditing-internet-exposed-vcenter-for-cve-2026-123890-patch-priority-and-log-evidence

Malicious versions of Microsoft's Agent Framework were reportedly published to PyPI, with reporting tying the compromise to a release-pipeline certificate. This video walks through what that certificate actually attests to: which CI provider minted the identity, which repository and workflow file ran, which commit the build started from, and the artifact digest that got signed. It also covers what it does not attest to: that the build runner was clean, that the artifact's contents match the repository source, or that the code behaves benignly. The defensive takeaway is narrow and concrete: verify attestations at install time instead of treating them as a compliance checkbox, pin third-party actions to a commit hash rather than a mutable tag, keep the id-token permission on the publish job alone rather than on the build job, gate publishing behind a protected environment, and avoid pulling a full dev dependency tree inside the job that builds the artifact. Nothing here is a working exploit; it is a lab-scoped look at workflow configuration and where the trust boundary sits. Details of the incident itself are drawn from secondary reporting, and the post is explicit about which parts are inference versus confirmed. Affected version ranges should come from the vendor advisory, not from this video. Full write-up: https://hackyjs.com/posts/how-a-release-pipeline-certificate-let-credential-stealing-wheels-ship-as-microsoft-agent-framework

CI installs exactly what package-lock.json pins, every integrity hash matches, and the build still dies on an import to a package that was never published. That isn't a lockfile bug. A lockfile is an integrity record for packages you already declared — npm ci reads two manifests and a lockfile, then fetches. It never opens src/, so a hallucinated bare specifier is invisible to it, and no amount of pinning turns a source-level name into a manifest-level fact. This short walks the failure end to end: 412 packages installed, zero lockfile changes, and a TS2307 at compile time. Then it separates the four shapes of a bad agent import — a name that never existed, a deprecated or renamed package, a real package with the wrong API surface, and a plausible name that belongs to someone else — because they don't share a fix. The controls that matter: a registry existence check for the first shape, a per-version deprecation check for the second, and for the third, the cheapest thing most teams already have and skip in CI for speed — a type check against the real type surface. The fourth shape is heuristic only. Full write-up: https://hackyjs.com/posts/why-lockfile-pinning-alone-wont-catch-hallucinated-imports-from-coding-agents