Anthropic's progress on provable inference for LLMs promises formal guarantees beyond empirical evals, but this walkthrough breaks down what those guarantees actually cover, the latency and engineering overhead they impose, and the failure modes they still cannot catch.
A deep technical guide to vetting Heim Datacenter's Omnes Capital-backed European expansion, covering latency benchmarking, failover validation, and exit-term risk for engineering teams.
A malicious Claude Code extension delivered through Cursor's supply chain shows how poisoned developer extensions abuse agent permissions, and how teams can audit installs, pin versions, and lock down update channels.
A stage-by-stage reproduction of Solar's claimed 100× Solidity compilation speedup, separating parsing, optimization, and code generation gains to show which smart-contract workloads actually benefit.
Solar is described as a new Solidity compiler with an "up to 100× faster" compilation claim, published by Paradigm Policy on 2 November 2026. The public source is one line: there is no baseline solc version, corpus, flag set, warm or cold state, or bytecode-equivalence check. This short follows the post's reproduction harness: pin the toolchain and binary hash, separate synthetic stress files from pinned real contract sets, isolate parsing with solc's stop-after flag, instrument phases, and report warm and cold runs separately. The goal is to make the claim falsifiable, not to debunk it. Full stage-by-stage write-up: https://hackyjs.com/posts/reproducing-solars-100-solidity-compilation-benchmark-stage-by-stage
A public proof-of-concept for a TightVNC pre-authentication remote code execution flaw on Windows is circulating, per a report dated 2 November 2026. This walkthrough is defensive: it reads the bug path instead of running it, and it starts from what you can actually measure this week. What the video covers: - Why "pre-auth" is architectural. In RFB (RFC 6143) the server sends a version banner, the client replies, and both sides agree on a security type before any credential is checked. That negotiation is reachable by anyone who can open a socket. - A handshake-only probe that prints the server banner and the offered security types. Type 2 is VNC authentication; type 1 is security type None, where the framebuffer is handed to anyone who finishes the handshake. - The three-step path from an open port to code running inside the VNC service, which on a default Windows install is likely LocalSystem. Treat that as inference and confirm per host. - What the report does not state: no CVE identifier, no affected version range, no fixed build. Until an advisory lands, treat the entire pre-auth path as suspect rather than assuming the handshake parser is the component. - What reduces exposure now: inventory every host with tvnserver installed and its on-disk file version, restrict port 5900 at the network edge, and check which account the service runs under. The classic VNC DES challenge-response weakness is a separate issue with a separate fix. Patching this RCE does not make VNC authentication strong, and hardening VNC authentication does not remove this bug. Full write-up with the checks and mitigations: https://hackyjs.com/posts/tightvnc-pre-auth-rce-reading-the-public-poc-and-verifying-your-own-exposure
A benchmark called GDPx exists, SemiAnalysis released it, and the reported top score is 12%, with the leading model identified as Opus 5.5. That is what the reporting establishes. What 12% means depends on whether a long-horizon task pays anything for getting most of the way there, and the post could not reach the GDPx task set or its scoring rule. So this video covers the harness the post builds in dependency-free Node JavaScript instead: decomposing a task into checkpoints that can be checked without reading the agent's prose, weighting those checkpoints by dependency depth so clearing the first three of five earns six of fifteen rather than sixty percent, and blocking a checkpoint when its parent failed without ever removing it from the denominator. The scores shown come from scripted policies in a stub sandbox, not from any frontier model. Full write-up: https://hackyjs.com/posts/scoring-partial-progress-in-agent-evals-a-gdpx-inspired-harness-in-javascript